关键词: 委托代理, 动态博弈, 棘轮效应, 声誉, 不对称信息, 供应链

Abstract: To study the multi-period incentive problem under asymmetric information of the manufacturing cost type in a retailer-led supply chain, a dynamic supply chain incentive contract model with the reputation caused by manufacturer cost was proposed by using the dynamic game and principal-agent theory. The research revealed that the optimal static contract could motivate the manufacturer to show the true type within one-period cooperation, but the revelation principle was no longer correct in two short-term cooperation relationship because of the ratchet effect. Under this circumstance, a model considering the reputation caused by manufacturer cost was set up to conclude the relationship between compensation for reputation and cost type of manufacturer displayed. Thus the ratchet effect was reduced. The numerical example was used to explain the specific implementation of the contract.

Key words: principal-agent, dynamic game, ratchet effect, reputation, asymmetric information, supply chains