关键词: 供应链, 委托代理, 不对称信息, 道德风险, 线性激励契约, 博弈

Abstract: In the context of a single-supplier and single-retailer supply chain, the retailers promotion efforts had great influence in market demand. However, due to asymmetric information, the supplier couldnt observe the retailers action, the immoral action came into being so as to affect the collaboration of the whole supply chain. To deal with this problem, the game between supplier and retailer was studied from the point of principal-agency theory. By comparing the linear contract under symmetric information with asymmetric information, different parameters effect on the commission rate, the agency cost and the expected income of the supplier was analyzed. Finally, how new observation variable affected the contract design was provided.

Key words: supply chain, principal agent, asymmetric information, moral hazard, linear incentive contract, game