关键词: 低碳生产, 补贴政策, 双寡头市场, 博弈模型

Abstract: Aiming at a duopoly market which consisted of a leader manufacturing enterprise and a follower manufacturing enterprise,the mechanism of low-carbon production behavior affected by subsidy policy was analyzed systematically by constructing Stackelberg game model of those two enterprises.The research showed that the incentive effects of subsidy policy were different among different enterprises.When the subsidy intensity reached a certain threshold,the leading enterprise would take the lead in selecting low-carbon production,and the follower manufacturing enterprise would select likewise along with the subsidies further increased.When the two enterprises faced with high production cost of low-carbon products and low consumer preferences for low-carbon products,the government should give higher subsidies to low-carbon enterprises.The low carbon subsidy policy to maximize the social welfare was negatively correlated with the low carbon preferences of consumers,while was positively correlated with the low carbon emission reduction rate,the environmental benefits of low carbon products and the government's emphasis on the environment.

Key words: low-carbon manufacturing, government subsidies, duopolistic markets, game theory model