Abstract: To explore the optimal decision-making for green supply chain innovation efforts under different government subsidy scenarios,a green supply chain that dominated by manufacturer and composed of supplier and retailer was constructed,and its innovation effort decision strategies that the supplier and manufacturer made green innovation effort decisions and the retailer priced products were discussed.By analyzing three cases of government subsidies to the supplier,manufacturer and consumers,the profit function models of green supply chain members were constructed respectively.The optimal decisions and profits of each member under different subsidies were found through using game theory and reverse induction method.The impact of the total amount of government subsidies and the sensitivity coefficient of the green level of products on the green supply chain was further discussed.The research showed that when the government subsidized the supplier and manufacturer respectively,it was the most favorable to improve their own green innovation efforts;when the government subsidized the consumers,the supplier and manufacturer could make more profits,and the retailer's profit was the highest when the government subsidized the manufacturer.

Key words: government subsidies, green supply chain, green innovation efforts, Stackelberg model

摘要： 为探讨不同政府补贴情形下绿色供应链创新努力最优决策问题,本研究构建由制造商主导,供应商和零售商组成的绿色供应链,供应商和制造商进行产品绿色创新努力,零售商进行定价。通过分析政府对供应商、制造商和消费者进行补贴的3种情形,分别构建绿色供应链成员的利润函数模型,运用博弈理论和逆向归纳法,优化得到不同补贴情形下各成员的最优决策和利润,并探讨了产品绿色水平敏感系数和政府补贴总额对绿色供应链最优策略及利润的影响。研究表明,当政府对供应商和制造商进行补贴时,可获得较高的产品绿色创新努力程度;当政府对消费者进行补贴时,可使供应商和制造商获利较多,而零售商则在政府对制造商进行补贴时盈利最高。

关键词: 政府补贴, 绿色供应链, 绿色创新努力, 斯塔克尔伯格模型