Abstract: Considering the impact of consumer feedback co-governance on cross-border e-commerce platform merchants' business decisions,in view of the credit supervision of cross-border e-commerce platform merchants,an evolutionary game model of consumer feedback co-governance,platform merchant self-discipline operation,and cross-border e-commerce platform co-governance supervision was established,and the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of each participant in the issue of platform seller credit supervision and governance under different  circumstances was discussed.With the numerical simulation,the decision-making behavior of each subject in the process of platform seller credit supervision and governance was analyzed.The results showed that the governance of cross-border e-commerce platform sellers' credit supervision dilemma was influenced by the different strategies and behaviors of each member,the strategies of each participant had an impact on their own and each other's future decisions.When consumers conducted feedback and co-governance,the reputation (negative or positive) of platform merchants would increase,which standardized the business behavior of platform merchants to a certain extent.Merchants' business behavior was deeply influenced by opportunism,and a high detection rate in the platform could effectively restrain merchants' behavior.Meanwhile,the co-governance and supervision,high intensity of punishment and compensation were conducive to the establishment of a good credit system for merchants on the platform.

Key words: cross-border e-commerce, credit supervision, feedback co-governance, evolutionary game

摘要： 考虑到消费者反馈共治对平台商家经营决策的影响,针对跨境电商平台商家信用监督问题,建立消费者反馈共治、平台商家自律经营、跨境电商平台共治监管的演化博弈模型,探讨了不同情境下各参与方在平台卖家信用监督治理问题的演化均衡策略,并借助数值仿真分析各主体在平台卖家信用监督治理过程中的决策行为。研究发现:跨境电商平台卖家“信用监管困境”治理受各成员不同策略行为的共同作用,各参与方策略对自身及彼此间的未来决策均有影响;消费者在进行反馈共治时,对平台商家评价的声誉(负面或正面声誉)增加,均会在一定程度上规范平台商家的经营行为;商家经营行为深受机会主义的影响,平台中高力度的查处率可有效约束商家行为,同时采取共治监管、较高强度的惩罚力度及赔偿强度均有助于平台商家良好信用体系的建设。

关键词: 跨境电商, 信用监督, 反馈共治, 演化博弈