Abstract: To investigate impact of customer firm and service providing firms risk aversion on the optimal linear contracts,an incentive model where a customer firm participated in service outsourcing production was constructed based on team production theory.The sufficient and necessary condition was discussed for existence of model solutions,and the properties satisfied by optimal solution were characterized.Besides the production technology characteristics,the optimal linear sharing ratio was affected by risk aversion degrees of the two firms.The optimal linear distribution ratio of service providing firm was decreasing in its risk aversion degrees,and increasing in risk aversion degrees of the customer firm.In particular,the optimal linear distribution ratio was independent of the bargaining powers of two firms.Furthermore,the influence mechanism of bargaining powers and risk aversion on the optimal linear contract was revealed.An example was presented to verify the validity of the proposed model.

Key words: service outsourcing, linear sharing contract, risk aversion, bargaining power

摘要： 为了考察接包企业和发包企业风险厌恶偏好对线性分成契约的影响,基于团队生产理论构造了发包企业参与外包生产下服务外包的激励模型。讨论了模型解存在的充要条件,刻画了最优解满足的特性。服务外包的最优线性分成比例除了受生产技术特性的影响外,还受协作双方风险厌恶的影响;接包企业的最优线性分成比例是其风险厌恶程度的减函数,是发包企业风险厌恶程度的增函数,且独立于双方的相对谈判能力。揭示了谈判能力和风险厌恶对线性分成契约的影响机理。提供了一个算例以验证模型的有效性。

关键词: 服务外包, 线性分成契约, 风险厌恶, 谈判能力