关键词: 消费者低碳偏好, 产业集群, 能源共享, 成本分担, 微分博弈

Abstract: Under the low-carbon preference of consumers,considering the low-carbon effect brought by energy sharing,the energy sharing strategy problem of industrial clusters was studied with the help of differential game theory.The HJB equation was used to analyze the optimal trajectories of equilibrium strategies,total system profits and energy sharing synergy effects over time for the core and supporting firms in three decision scenarios:centralized decision,decentralized decision,and Stackelberg game with introduction of cost-sharing contracts.By comparing the results of the three games,the result showed that the centralized decision had the highest energy sharing synergy,profit of both parties and total system profit,and the Stackelberg game was better than the decentralized decision,and the cost-sharing contract could achieve the coordination of overall interests.The theoretical derivation results were verified by numerical simulation,and the mechanisms of the effects of consumer low-carbon preferences and government energy low-carbon subsidies on energy sharing in industrial clusters were analyzed to provide a theoretical basis for government and enterprise decision-making.

Key words: consumers' low carbon preference, industrial clusters, energy sharing, cost sharing contract, differential game