关键词: 内核层级授权, 架构层级授权, 质量升级, 自主研发, 技术密集供应链

Abstract: Based on kernel-level licensing or architecture-level licensing of technology provider,the quality and price strategies of technology-intensive supply chain considering manufacturers’ Research and Development (R&D) modes were constructed.Applying numerical examples,the impacts of competition intensity,quality cost coefficient and licensing fee on equilibrium results were analyzed.The applicability of different licensing models to the market and the boundary conditions of manufacturers’ choice of core component outsourcing or in-house R&D models were explored.The results showed that the competition and quality upgrade could promote the quality investment of technology provider;however,the increase of quality cost would motivate manufacturers to shift from quality competition to price competition,resulting in the emergence of inferior products.When the strategic manufacturer’s ability was weak,it was more profitable to adopt the outsourcing R&D;otherwise,the strategic manufacturer (M2) adopting in-house R&D could get more benefits.Under the asymmetric market structure,the two manufacturers had different strategic preferences when the licensing fee of M2 was lower.It was always better for the provider to choose the architecture-level authorization.

Key words: kernel-level authorization, architecture-level authorization, quality upgrade, in-house research and development, technology-intensive supply chain