Abstract: To improve the performance of cloud manufacturing platform investment value-added service decision-making,the influence of two-sided platforms' game timings and users' information levels on demand function in the process of investing value-added service were analyzed,and the two-sided market gaming model under three possible timings of cloud manufacturing platform games in which two sides play games simultaneously and each side can begin to play a game before the other was developed.The optimal comparison results showed that the optimal investments and profits were the same in the monopoly market when platform invested the bilateral and unilateral value-added services.In the competitive bottleneck market,the optimal investments and profits were the same under the simultaneous games and first-playing games with the buyers,but their profits were worse than the optimal profits of first-playing games with the sellers.In the duopoly market,the optimal investments and profits were the same under sequential games between buyers and sellers,and their profits were better than the profits of simultaneous games.

Key words: cloud manufacturing platform, value-added service investment, users lacking information, game model

摘要： 为了提升云制造平台投资增值服务决策的绩效水平,在考虑用户缺乏信息水平以及增值服务对用户需求函数的影响基础上,分别建立了同时博弈、先与买方博弈和先与卖方博弈3种时序和垄断、竞争瓶颈和双寡头3种不同市场结构下云制造平台单边和双边投资增值服务的博弈决策模型。比较分析发现,垄断市场中3种博弈时序下云制造平台增值服务最优投资量和最优利润各自均相同;竞争瓶颈市场中同时博弈和先与买方博弈时序下云制造平台单边和双边增值服务最优投资量和最优利润各自均相同,且两者的最优利润都低于先与卖方博弈时序情形;双寡头市场中先与卖方博弈和先与买方博弈时序下云制造平台增值服务最优投资量和最优利润均各自相同,且两者的最优利润都高于同时博弈时序情形。

关键词: 云制造平台, 增值服务投资, 用户缺乏信息, 博弈模型