Abstract: Aiming at a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer,and considering the joint impact of pricing and non-cooperative/cooperative advertising on dual-channel demand,three different game-theoretical models were developed under the setting of no advertising investment from both parties,the retailer engaged in all of the local advertising expenditures,and two parties offered a cooperative advertising program respectively.The equilibrium optimal pricing and advertising policies,as well as the profits of channel members and the whole supply chain were investigated for each model,and compared among three different models.The research showed that the better the product's compatibility with the web was,the lower the retailer's local advertising effort level and the higher the manufacturer's participation rate in the cooperative advertising were;the retailer's local advertising campaigns could increase the profits of both the manufacturer and the whole supply chain,and the manufacturer's cooperative advertising program could further boost them.Thus,the retailers preferred the manufacturer not to use cooperative advertising programs when they conducted local advertising campaigns.

Key words: dual channel supply chain, cooperative advertising, pricing, Stackelberg game, online direct selling

摘要： 针对一个开展网络直销业务的双渠道制造商供应链系统,考虑商品定价及零售商地方性广告对双渠道需求的联合影响,分别从供应链双方均无广告投入、完全由零售商承担地方性广告投入、供应链双方开展合作广告3种不同情形构建博弈决策模型,分析并比较讨论了不同情形下的双渠道商品定价和广告投入最优决策,以及供应链双方和整体的盈利情况。研究结果表明,商品在线销售兼容度越好,零售商愿意付出的广告努力程度越低,而双渠道制造商对合作广告的参与度越高;零售商的地方性广告活动能够提升双渠道制造商和供应链整体的利润水平,制造商的合作广告计划能够进一步提高制造商和供应链整体的利润;零售商进行广告活动时更愿意双渠道制造商不提供合作广告计划。

关键词: 双渠道供应链, 合作广告, 定价, Stackelberg博弈, 网络直销