关键词: 服务外包, 线性分成契约, 风险厌恶, 谈判能力

Abstract: To investigate impact of customer firm and service providing firms risk aversion on the optimal linear contracts,an incentive model where a customer firm participated in service outsourcing production was constructed based on team production theory.The sufficient and necessary condition was discussed for existence of model solutions,and the properties satisfied by optimal solution were characterized.Besides the production technology characteristics,the optimal linear sharing ratio was affected by risk aversion degrees of the two firms.The optimal linear distribution ratio of service providing firm was decreasing in its risk aversion degrees,and increasing in risk aversion degrees of the customer firm.In particular,the optimal linear distribution ratio was independent of the bargaining powers of two firms.Furthermore,the influence mechanism of bargaining powers and risk aversion on the optimal linear contract was revealed.An example was presented to verify the validity of the proposed model.

Key words: service outsourcing, linear sharing contract, risk aversion, bargaining power